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This thesis explores possible solutions to secure the aggregation and 
sharing of healthcare’s quantified-self data, based on lessons from the personal 
financial industry. To address this concern, Porter’s Five Forces Framework is 
used to understand how consumers are impacted by the two sectors’ differences 
in legislation, technology, and security. The analysis in this thesis indicates that 
consumers of financial account aggregators benefit from more secure and 
interoperable services. In contrast, users of healthcare aggregators are 
negatively affected by the healthcare industry’s higher threat of new entrants  
the and bargaining power of suppliers. Therefore, healthcare leaders should 
improve consumer benefits by transforming their industry’s competitive forces to 
mimic those of the financial services industry. To accomplish this goal, industry 
leaders could focus on filling the gap in the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPAA) for self-generated data, improving security 
innovations, and attracting third-party developers to secure data interoperability. 
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Healthcare industry’s quantified-self movement empowers individuals via 
active self-tracking. This movement describes individuals’ use of applications and 
devices, such as Fitbit, to monitor and manage their health. Most importantly, the 
granularity of quantified-self data holds the potential to truly personalize 
healthcare. However, this consolidation of detailed personal data also 
exponentially increases information security and privacy risks. Ultimately, these 
vulnerabilities in data aggregation and sharing impede progression towards 
personalized healthcare. Therefore, this thesis addresses healthcare industry’s 
lack of security with successful practices from the personal financial sector.  
To determine applicable smart practices, a comparative case study was 
conducted between the financial services and healthcare industries. The 
comparison focused on three key factors that influence data aggregation and 
sharing in the two sectors: legislation, technology, and security. These areas 
signify different ways in which industries impact consumer benefits through 
relevant security and privacy practices. To discern the effects on consumer 
benefits, this thesis used Porter’s Five Forces Framework to evaluate the two 
sectors. The five forces are competitive rivalry, threat of new entrants, threat of 
substitute products or services, bargaining power of suppliers, and bargaining 
power of buyers.1  
The results of Porter’s Five Forces Framework indicate that consumers 
benefit more from the personal financial industry in comparison to the healthcare 
sector. The personal financial industry is not as competitive due to its lower 
threat of new entrants and bargaining power of suppliers. The financial services 
sector is more resilient to the threat of new entrants, because of its 
comprehensive legislation and innovative security measures that serve as 
                                            
1 Michael E. Porter, Competitive Strategy: Techniques for Analyzing Industries and 
Competitors: With a New Introduction (New York, NY: The Free Press, 1998), 
http://www.vnseameo.org/ndbmai/CS.pdf. 
 xiv
barriers to entry. Also, since third parties produced most of the financial 
aggregators, banking institutions have lower bargaining powers as the industry’s 
suppliers. These weaker forces enable personal financial aggregators to provide 
their consumers with more secure and interoperable services. Therefore, 
healthcare leaders should reform their industry’s competitive forces to imitate that 
of financial services.  
Based on the analysis and outcomes, this thesis provides three 
recommendations to increase consumer benefits in the healthcare industry. First 
is to fill the gap in the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
(HIPAA). Currently, HIPAA does not define consumers as a covered entity. 
Hence, its provisions do not protect the security and privacy of user-generated 
health data. In contrast, policymakers are able to extend financial industry’s 
existing legislation to account aggregators. Thus, users of financial account 
aggregators continue to enjoy comprehensive protections. To follow suit, 
policymakers should fill this gap in HIPAA’s coverage to ensure the security and 
privacy of consumer-generated health data.  
The second recommendation is to encourage healthcare industry’s 
security innovations. Personal finance as an industry prioritizes its security 
efforts, as demonstrated by account aggregators’ innovative solutions. For 
example, a leading account aggregator, Mint, has invented and patented its 
pioneering security process to counter a key vulnerability of the screen scraping 
aggregation method. Financial account aggregators go to great lengths to 
reassure their users of information security. This commitment not only deters 
competitors with sub-standard security measures from entering the market, but it 
also encourages consumers to adopt account aggregation services. As 
demonstrated by those in the financial services sector, leaders of the healthcare 
industry should also focus their efforts on such security innovations.  
The last recommendation is to attract third-party developers to facilitate 
the interoperability of secure data. As producers of most leading financial 
account aggregators, third-party developers prioritize data integration across 
 xv
various sources. This focus closely aligns with consumer interests. On the other 
hand, healthcare corporations assume dominant roles in both manufacturing 
devices and providing aggregation services. Because of this dual role, corporate 
leaders tend to be focused solely on the internal interoperability between their 
devices and the associated apps, rather than external integration with other 
apps, devices, and platforms. For instance, corporations block public access to 
their protocols and prevent others from connecting to their devices with 
proprietary protocols. Moreover, the lack of standardized protocols could result in 
some databases being more susceptible to hacking, which would cause any 
connected systems to become vulnerable as well. Therefore, healthcare leaders 
should moderate corporate ownership to attain secure data integration.  
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A. RESEARCH QUESTION 
As more consumers adopt technologies to quantify their lives, can the 
healthcare community apply the experience of securing the aggregation and 
sharing of financial data to the quantified-self data, without discouraging 
innovation in the healthcare industry? 
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The quantified-self movement empowers individuals through active self-
monitoring. Self-tracking enables participants to quantify their internal and 
external experiences with the world.1 As part of the movement, individuals track 
inputs into the body, emotional and physiological states, and mental and physical 
performances via wearable technologies.2 They can immediately observe their 
bodies’ responses to changes in their behaviors, which then motivate them to 
take ownership of their health.3  This instant feedback encourages individuals to 
become more aware and interested in self-monitored health.  
Aside from empowering individuals, the quantified-self movement has the 
potential to truly personalize healthcare. While major advancements in genomic 
mapping have taken place, tracking of physical indicators such as “blood 
pressure [and] self-reported activity levels” remains manual and archaic.4 The 
quantified-self movement enables the automation of detailed physical and 
physiological monitoring. Better tracking of these responses would lead to more 
tailored and effective treatment plans.  
                                            
1 Nadine Razzouk, “Quantified Self,” 2015, http://ft.parsons.edu/skin/wp-content/uploads/
2015/05/Nadine_RAZZOUK1.pdf. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Maulik D. Majmudar, Lina Avancini Colucci, and Adam B. Landman, “The Quantified 
Patient of the Future: Opportunities and Challenges,” Healthcare (Amsterdam, Netherlands) 3, 
no. 3 (September 2015): 153–56, doi:10.1016/j.hjdsi.2015.02.001. 
4 Ibid. 
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Another aspect to accomplishing personalized healthcare is the 
systematic use of big data analytics. Machine-learning algorithms use databases 
to produce significant findings.5 The findings rely on algorithms to establish 
population-level baselines and to pinpoint variability.6 Once abnormal behaviors 
or activities are identified, devices could alert their users with personalized 
messages. For instance, the optimal hours of sleep a night typically vary from 
person to person.7 Therefore, by monitoring an individual’s sleep pattern, 
unusual deviations from the norm could be easily detected. Given Swan’s 
research showing that sleep deprivation and degradation lead to diabetes,8 a 
drop in sleep quality could be indicative of serious health conditions that might 
require behavioral changes. By making individuals aware of such issues, they 
could then take preventative actions to improve their health.  
Along with the aforementioned benefits, the quantified-self movement also 
exponentially increases the security risks of aggregated and shared information. 
Traditional personally identifiable information (PII) mainly consists of identity and 
contact information. Yet, it already carries serious threats to consumers’ security 
and privacy. Posing an even greater threat, self-tracking data captures PII at a 
much higher volume and greater granularity, which could even be used to predict 
individuals’ future behaviors.9  Unfortunately, since most self-monitoring services 
are linked to mobile applications, they retain similar security issues as typical 
mobile apps.10 Examples of vulnerabilities include location tracking, unencrypted 
transmission of personal data, nonexistent privacy policies, contact of multiple 
                                            
5 Melanie Swan, “The Quantified Self: Fundamental Disruption in Big Data Science and 




9 Mario Ballano Barcena, Candid Wueest, and Hon Lau, How Safe Is Your Quantified Self? 
(Mountain View, CA: Symantec Corporation, August 11, 2014), 19, http://www.symantec.com/
content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/how-safe-is-your-quantified-
self.pdf.   
10 Ibid. 
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domains, insecure session management, and unintended data leakages.11 If 
these vulnerabilities are exploited, malicious actors could use the stolen 
information for insurance fraud, identity theft, financial gain, prescription drug 
abuse, or targeted attacks.12 More importantly, consumers’ lives could be 
seriously threatened if healthcare professionals and researchers used falsified or 
altered data to derive treatment plans and medical findings. The lack of security 
would not only sabotage the quantified-self movement, but it could also result in 
aggressive backlashes from endangered patients.  
Ultimately, this lack of security when aggregating and sharing quantified-
self data impedes the advancement of personalized healthcare. Leading 
technology companies are attempting to overcome these barriers via recent 
application releases. To evaluate the effectiveness and security of the healthcare 
industry’s existing efforts to address this issue, a comparative case study is 
conducted against successful personal financial aggregators. Specifically, the 
analysis assesses distinctions between the two industries based on Porter’s Five 
Forces Framework. Smart practices from the financial services are reviewed to 
offer recommendations for securing the aggregation and sharing of quantified-
self data.  
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review focuses on published research regarding data 
aggregation and sharing in the healthcare and financial industries. The first 
section describes the aggregation, sharing, and security issues of the quantified-
self data. These identified issues are accompanied by respective mitigation 
strategies. The next section concentrates on the most vulnerable aggregation 
method in the financial industry, and possible approaches to manage the risks of 
this method are discussed subsequently.  
                                            
11 Ibid. 




1. Aggregation, Sharing, and Security Challenges of the 
Quantified-Self Data 
This section examines aggregation, sharing, and security challenges in 
the healthcare industry along with potential solutions. One of the challenges is 
data silo, which is driven by corporations that segregate users’ information by 
independently storing it within the bounds of their devices or apps. Secondly, 
corporate leaders are unwilling to focus their efforts on enabling integration with 
data from other devices or apps. In addition, users’ experiences could be 
negatively affected by challenges in data quality that stem from duplicate and 
unverifiable records. Furthermore, quantified-self participants experience 
increased security and privacy concerns because of the voluminous and frequent 
accumulation of personal data. The granularity of this data makes protecting 
individuals’ identities even more difficult. 
a. Data Silos 
Data silos originate from corporations limiting users from accessing their 
personal data. Since most consumer-generated healthcare data is collected via 
mobile applications or wearable devices, this data tends to reside within the 
bounds of service providers. For instance, users’ access to minute-to-minute 
Fitbit data is restricted.13 To retrieve their data, users need to request special 
access from the Fitbit team.14  
The following researchers validate this phenomenon by noting corporate 
ownership as the primary cause to data fragmentation. As Chris Till states, users’ 
exercise data is compartmentalized and owned by the application or equipment 
providers.15 Companies segregate users’ data by containing it within their apps 
                                            
13 Ernesto Ramirez, “How to Download Minute-by-Minute Fitbit Data,” Quantified Self, 
September 26, 2014, http://quantifiedself.com/2014/09/download-minute-fitbit-data/. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Chris Till, “Exercise as Labour: Quantified Self and the Transformation of Exercise into 
Labour,” Societies 4, no. 3 (August 28, 2014): 446–62, doi:10.3390/soc4030446. 
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or devices, creating barriers to data aggregation.16 Even though Chris Till’s 
research was based mainly on fitness applications, other researchers support 
similar findings. Melanie Swan discusses the need to aggregate healthcare 
information across multiple data streams: “wearable electronics, biosensors, 
mobile phones, genomic data, and cloud-based services.”17 Overcoming these 
confinements is the only way to achieve extensive data integration. 
Yet, corporate leaders are not producing solutions to eliminate data silos. 
Shameer et al. pointed out the aforementioned phenomenon of product-specific 
databases as well as corporations’ lack of effort to create integration tools.18 
Without the necessary tools to integrate data, fragmented databases continue to 
remain isolated. Furthermore, Gay and Leijdekkers indicated that existing 
protocols are too diverse and not available enough to the public.19 They also 
noted that some vendors’ proprietary protocols even prevent third parties from 
communicating directly with the devices. The heterogeneous and inaccessible 
protocols further obstruct the integration effort.   
As one possible solution to integrate data, application programming 
interface (API) seems to have gained the widest acclaim. API platforms specify 
how various data sources should interact.20 Shameer et al. suggest using APIs 
as a primary method for integration.21 Also, Gay and Leijdekkers used APIs to 
create a mobile application, myFitnessCompanion, which integrates activity 
                                            
16 Ibid. 
17 Swan, “The Quantified Self.” 
18 Khader Shameer et al., “Translational Bioinformatics in the Era of Real-Time Biomedical, 
Healthcare and Wellness Data Streams,” Briefings in Bioinformatics, February 14, 2016, bbv118, 
doi:10.1093/bib/bbv118. 
19 Valerie Gay and Peter Leijdekkers, “Bringing Health and Fitness Data Together for 
Connected Health Care: Mobile Apps as Enablers of Interoperability,” Journal of Medical Internet 
Research 17, no. 11 (November 18, 2015), doi:10.2196/jmir.5094. 
20 Melanie Swan, “Sensor Mania! The internet of Things, Wearable Computing, Objective 
Metrics, and the Quantified Self 2.0,” Journal of Sensor and Actuator Networks 1, no. 3 
(November 8, 2012): 217–53, doi:10.3390/jsan1030217. 
21 Shameer et al., “Translational Bioinformatics in the Era of Real-Time Biomedical, Health 
Care and Wellness Data Streams.” 
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trackers, wireless sensors, and servers.22 While this app succeeded in 
aggregating data from a variety of sources, it is only available for Android 
platforms and does not integrate with the official electronic health record (EHR) 
systems, which block all third-party accesses.23 However, researchers noted 
existing efforts to integrate APIs, such as Apple HealthKit or ResearchKit, with 
EHRs.24 These efforts signify healthcare industry’s attempt to close the gap by 
integrating personal informatics with EHRs.25 Based on these publications, 
researchers agree that APIs have the potential to solve the data fragmentation 
issue, though challenges still exist in integrating personal and EHR data.  
b. Data Quality 
Once aggregated, data quality could be affected by multiple readings and 
unverifiable information. In regards to data duplication, Gay and Leijdekkers 
claim that multiple sources of data could result in numerous recordings, such as 
simultaneous heart rate readings by different devices.26 Since different devices 
might not always capture the same readings, such discrepancies could 
negatively impact the accuracy of medical research or treatment plans.27 
Subsequently, data reliability is yet another concern, especially since the 
quantified-self devices are not regulated.28  Consumers could suffer serious 
consequences if medical diagnoses are based on unreliable data from inferior 
sensors.29   
                                            
22 Gay and Leijdekkers, “Bringing Health and Fitness Data Together for Connected 
Healthcare.” 
23 Ibid. 
24 Shameer et al., “Translational Bioinformatics in the Era of Real-Time Biomedical, 
Healthcare and Wellness Data Streams.” 
25 Ibid. 






Fortunately, data duplication and reliability issues are manageable. To 
minimize data discrepancies, apps can allow users to designate the primary 
source of real-time data.30 Also, tracking data sources could help to alleviate 
reliability issues.31 Consumers, healthcare professionals, and medical 
researchers could evaluate data quality based on the reliability of its sources. 
These straightforward solutions for data duplication and reliability can be easily 
implemented to improve information quality.  
c. Privacy and Security 
In addition to data interoperability and quality concerns, quantified-self 
participants do not want their privacy compromised in exchange for sharing their 
information. A 2014 American Health Information Management Association 
Journal article indicated that over 90% of those willing to share their data 
prioritized the need for anonymity.32 These consumers believe in advancing 
healthcare by sharing detailed information about their behaviors, but they insist 
on maintaining their privacy. According to Diamond et al., privacy is a key 
attribute in obtaining public trust for information sharing.33 Anonymity drives 
voluntary participation, which increases the volume and accuracy of data 
available for medical diagnoses and research studies.  
Notably, privacy is especially important to consumers when sharing their 
information with the government. Anderson et al. claim that consumers require 
additional assurance to share information with the government and public health 
agencies versus hospitals and pharmaceutical companies.34 However, traditional 
                                            
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid.  
32 Harry Rhodes, “Accessing and Using Data from Wearable Fitness Devices” 85, no. 9 
(September 2014): 48–50. 
33 Carol C. Diamond, Farzad Mostashari, and Clay Shirky, “Collecting And Sharing Data For 
Population Health: A New Paradigm,” Health Affairs 28, no. 2 (March 1, 2009): 454–66, 
doi:10.1377/hlthaff.28.2.454. 
34 Catherine L. Anderson and Ritu Agarwal, “The Digitization of Healthcare: Boundary Risks, 
Emotion, and Consumer Willingness to Disclose Personal Health Information,” Information 
Systems Research, April 8, 2011, http://pubsonline.informs.org/doi/abs/10.1287/isre.1100.0335. 
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mechanisms to ensure data privacy, such as HIPAA, need to be revamped to 
match the current capabilities of data sharing via social networks and other 
means.35 Rhodes believes that as the industry reaches a level of maturity, 
information standardization and governance will be addressed accordingly, along 
with the need to balance privacy, confidentiality, security, intellectual property, 
and science.36  
Despite the emphasis on privacy, risks of compromising consumers’ 
identities surge, because detailed personal data is gathered and shared at a high 
frequency. Swan argues for difficulty in protecting individuals’ identities when a 
large quantity of personal healthcare data is openly shared.37 This dataset allows 
patterns of distinctive characteristics to be tracked. As more behaviors are 
digitized, these unique characteristics could easily be used to identify individuals.  
Apart from privacy, real-life implications of these data also support the 
need for enhanced security. Swan predicted that data would become an 
intermediary of individuals’ experiences with reality, and thereby taking on a 
more intimate role.38 Swan continued to suggest that it would become an 
extension of people’s subjective experiences with the potential to change 
behaviors. In essence, individuals’ experiences are translated into a sequence of 
numbers. After assessing these values, individuals could adjust how they interact 
with their surroundings accordingly. Therefore, they could gravely endanger their 
health if they modified their behaviors based on tampered data. This intimate 
relationship with the quantified-self data would require more robust security to 
prevent malicious manipulation.  
As a result, possible solutions have been suggested to boost the security 
of quantified-self data. Based on a white paper published in 2014, Symantec 
                                            
35 Swan, “Sensor Mania! The internet of Things, Wearable Computing, Objective Metrics, 
and the Quantified Self 2.0.” 
36 Harry Rhodes, “Accessing and Using Data from Wearable Fitness Devices.” 
37 Swan, “Sensor Mania! The internet of Things, Wearable Computing, Objective Metrics, 
and the Quantified Self 2.0.” 
38 Swan, “The Quantified Self.” 
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Corporation described various security issues with the quantified-self movement 
and provided possible mitigation strategies for using a single data stream.39 
Symantec’s recommendations for users include effective passwords, device-
based security measures, full device encryption, and disabling Bluetooth 
whenever possible. Even though Symantec only focused on vulnerabilities of one 
data source, it identified risks and solutions that could be applicable to 
aggregated data as well. On the other hand, Doukas et al. support digital 
certificates and PKI data encryption to secure the internet of Things gateways 
that aggregate health data from sensors.40 Their solutions warrant that patients’ 
data are shared securely with authenticated recipients. As a third option, 
Diamond et al. claim that collecting only aggregated data will mitigate concerns 
regarding centralized databases of PIIs.41 Preventing aggregators from collecting 
PIIs from start removes any traceability to the participants. Thus, far, despite 
consensus to prioritize security, researchers have yet to reach an agreement on 
the best solution to address these challenges. 
2. The Most Vulnerable Method of Financial Account Aggregation 
Financial account aggregators, like Mint, have succeeded in advancing 
the security of personal financial services. These web services provide 
individuals a holistic view of their financial portfolios with ease and security. 
Despite concerns, none of the financial aggregators in the United States are 
authorized to transfer funds as of 2002.42 Without the potential risk of 
compromising users’ bank accounts, financial aggregators continue to flourish. 
                                            
39 See Barcena, Wueest, and Lau, How Safe Is Your Quantified Self?” 
40 C. Doukas et al., “Enabling Data Protection through PKI Encryption in IoT M-Health 
Devices,” in 2012 IEEE 12th International Conference on Bioinformatics Bioengineering (BIBE), 
2012, 25–29, doi:10.1109/BIBE.2012.6399701. 
41 Diamond, Mostashari, and Shirky, “Collecting And Sharing Data For Population Health.” 
42 Hiroshi Fujii et al., “E-Aggregation: The Present and Future of Online Financial Services in 
Asia-Pacific,” SSRN Scholarly Paper (Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, July 1, 
2002), http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=376864. 
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There are three main methods of account aggregation: screen scraping, 
permissive aggregation, and user-driven aggregation. Screen scraping requires 
an individual’s authentic username and personal identification number (PIN) for 
each bank account in order for the aggregator to obtain user’s information from 
these accounts.43 Permissive aggregation, or direct feed, describes the method 
of partnering with financial institutions to obtain direct access to users’ 
accounts.44 The third method, user-driven, requires users to download agent 
software onto their personal computers.45 Then, aggregator services can access 
users’ accounts via the authentications stored on users’ computers.46 Given that 
screen scraping is the most popular yet least secure method of the three, the 
subsequent sections primarily focus on exploring its weaknesses and the 
financial industry’s responses. 
a. Vulnerabilities of Screen Scraping  
The screen scraping method is accompanied by three main vulnerabilities. 
The Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) warned against 
screen scraping because of its associated weaknesses.47 First is the need to 
surrender users’ login information to the account aggregators.48 By surrendering 
their account access information, consumers amplify the risk of their accounts 
being compromised. Delivery of accurate data is another concern, since frequent 
updates to banks’ websites could result in unreliable data.49 Screen scraping 
requires very specific mapping to websites’ layouts, so any changes to the 
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websites would directly impact data quality. Also, these aggregators need to 
proactively seek out and capture new information, because they are not 
synchronized with users’ bank accounts for automatic updates. As a result, the 
aggregation services might not always display the most current account data. 
Third is users’ dependency on aggregators’ ability to protect their usernames and 
passwords.50 This vulnerability poses the greatest threat to information security. 
Ann Spiotto confirmed that screen scraping is the most popular yet dangerous 
method, because of its possible data errors, delays in transmission, and security 
issues relating to the use of consumers’ usernames and PINs.51 In essence, 
screen scraping is vulnerable predominantly because it requires users to 
surrender their bank accounts’ logon information.  
In contrast to screen scraping, user-driven agent and direct feed are 
perceived to be more secure because neither requires users to surrender their 
account information. For user-driven agent software, Agrawal et al. indicated that 
this alternative was introduced solely due to strong security concerns regarding 
screen scraping.52  They also stated that the user-driven method is perceived to 
be more secure, because it does not require users to surrender their account 
logon information. In regards to direct feed, FFIEC reasoned it to be a more 
reliable and traceable method compared to screen scraping.53 Despite FFIEC’s 
preference for direct feed, this method relies heavily on the partnership between 
aggregators and financial institutions, thus making it more difficult to pursue.  
b. Suggested Solutions 
Since screen scraping is unlikely to be completely replaced, researchers 
have suggested solutions to relief some of its core vulnerabilities. Agrawal et al. 
                                            
50 Ibid. 
51 Ann S. Spiotto, “Financial Account Aggregation: The Liability Perspective,” Fordham 
Journal of Corporate & Financial Law 8, no. 2 (2003): 557–605.  
52 Agrawal et al., “A Conceptual Approach to Information Security in Financial Account 
Aggregation.” 
53 FFIEC, “FFIEC IT Examination Handbook InfoBase – Appendix D: Aggregation Services.” 
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stated that the primary issue is that banks are unable to differentiate users’ 
identities.54 Since consumers and aggregators currently share the same 
credential, accesses from these two parties are indistinguishable to financial 
institutions.55 To manage this issue, proposed options include two-password 
model and logon pattern.56 The two-password model recommends for banks to 
issue different passwords to users and aggregators.57 On the other hand, the 
logon pattern detection distinguishes the two groups by identifying aggregators’ 
automatic logon and logoff patterns versus that of consumers’ manual logons.58  
Conversely, banks could reduce security and privacy concerns by taking 
on an active role in managing account aggregators. The Office of the Comptroller 
of the Currency of the Administrator of National Banks published a news release 
in 2001 for the Second Account Aggregation Conference to persuade firms to 
become an aggregator rather than being aggregated.59 Banks can successfully 
assume the aggregator role by overseeing their relationships with third parties 
and taking on responsibilities to ensure customer privacy.60 Moreover, as noted 
by Ann Spiotto,61 banks’ concerns diminished when they tried to partner with 
aggregator entities.  
Yet even with notable vulnerabilities associated with screen scraping, 
industry leaders refused unnecessary regulations that would hinder technological 
progression. Spiotto believes it made more sense to let businesses develop 
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before taking actions out of fear for liability.62 Furthermore, a number of 
correspondents argued against regulations that might prevent the creation of 
innovative solutions that benefit consumers.63 Since existing laws do protect 
users of aggregation services from financial losses, there is no immediate need 
for new regulations until the current ones become insufficient. Most importantly, 
developers of account aggregators have not declared any security breaches due 
to vulnerabilities of screen scraping. 
3. Conclusion 
This literature review demonstrates that there are some areas of 
consensus as well as some gaps in existing research for the healthcare sector. 
Currently, quantified-self participants are concerned about their information 
security and privacy, because of the vast and detailed data collected via 
healthcare aggregators. However, researchers have not presented consistent 
solutions. Therefore, given its success in securing the most vulnerable method of 
data aggregation, the personal financial industry might be able to provide some 
insights into how healthcare leaders could address securing the aggregation and 
sharing of quantified-self data. 
D. RESEARCH DESIGN 
The following sections discuss the study design. The sections include 
research objective, sample selection, data sources, method, and expected 
outcomes. To address the research question, this thesis focuses on a 
comparative study between the personal financial and healthcare industries. The 
comparison is expected to yield recommendations for healthcare leaders and 
policymakers. 
                                            
62 Julie L. Williams, “The Impact of Aggregation on the Financial Services Industry.” 
63 Ibid. 
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1. Objective  
The objective of this thesis is to obtain best security and privacy practices 
from the financial sector to apply to the healthcare industry. As an industry, 
personal finance has had a history of experience and success in digital 
information security. On the other hand, the healthcare sector has just started to 
embark on this journey of building its digital database via the quantified-self 
movement. Therefore, personal financial industry’s smart practices would help to 
expedite healthcare sector’s efforts in overcoming relevant security and privacy 
concerns in order to achieve personalized healthcare. 
2. Sample Selection 
To compare the two industries, three factors are selected to demonstrate 
how each sector relates to its consumers. The factors are legislation, technology, 
and security. These elements represent the different ways that consumers could 
be impacted by industries’ practices. For legislation, this thesis examines existing 
laws and regulations relevant to data aggregation and sharing. In terms of 
technology and security, the functionalities of selected aggregators are assessed 
with respect to each factor. 
The aggregators are selected based on their relevance, amount of 
publically available information, industry dominance, and distinguishing 
functionalities. For financial services, Mint (owned by Intuit) and Personal Capital 
(owned by Yodlee) are used as primary examples given the two services’ 
reputations, longevity, and popularity among their users. These two services not 
only represent the most established financial aggregators, but both are also 
supported by reputable financial software companies. Additionally, Betterment is 
included for its innovative investments tools.  
With the same selection criteria, aggregators developed by Apple and 
Google are included as predominant examples from the healthcare industry. The 
specific applications and APIs are Apple Health, HealthKit, ResearchKit, CareKit, 
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and Google Fit. Lastly, Sherbit, a newly released application, is also studied for 
its promising capabilities to advance the quantified health. 
3. Source Data 
This thesis is supported mainly by qualitative data. Data sources include 
journal articles, research papers, government publications, news reports, and 
reviews and specifications of apps and APIs. These qualitative data are obtained 
via online resources such as government websites, Google Scholar, professional 
associations, Wall Street Journal, Apple, Google, Yodlee, and Intuit. Relevant 
information from these sources is presented to compare the two industries’ 
current security measures. It is also used subsequently to determine healthcare 
sector’s areas of improvement. 
4. Method 
From the policymakers’ perspective, consumer benefits and protections 
are of the utmost importance. To understand how different industry’s dynamics 
impact consumer benefits, a comparative analysis is conducted based on 
Porter’s Five Forces Framework. First, an overview of each industry is provided, 
comprising of the aforementioned categories: legislation, technology, and 
security. Then, to assess how the two industries relate to their consumers, each 
of the five forces is used as a basis for comparison. Finally, factors contributing 
to the success of financial account aggregators are evaluated to determine best 
practices that could be reapplied to the healthcare industry. 
5. Outcome 
The finished product consists of recommendations to secure healthcare 
data based on lessons from the financial services. Healthcare leaders could use 
the outputs from this thesis to better secure the aggregation and sharing of the 
quantified-self data. As a result, the recommended changes would help to build 
bigger and more robust databases that benefit the consumers, medical 
researchers, and healthcare professionals. Additionally, policymakers could 
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formalize the recommendations as policies or legislations to further safeguard 
consumers’ information security and privacy. 
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II. PERSONAL FINANCE 
Traditionally, financial transactions required the tangible movement of 
money and involvement of brick-and-mortar institutions. Money is a medium of 
exchange and is used to trade for goods or services.64 Common forms of money 
included precious metals, paper currency, and even paper receipts, such as 
checks.65 The trading of money is recorded as a financial transaction.66 Payment 
from one party to another represented the transferring of wealth ownership. For 
the transaction to take place, individuals needed to physically enter a bank and 
withdraw money, which are then handed or mailed to the receiving party.67 The 
other option is via the exchange of personal checks, which the recipient would 
then take to the bank to trade for money.68  
In contrast, financial transactions today are digitized with the evolution of 
electronic money and internet finance. Electronic money “exists only in banking 
computer systems and not held in any physical form.”69 In essence, it is virtual 
money represented by numbers transmitted from banks to customers.70 The 
widespread adoption of digital currency enabled the development of electronic 
finance as a new channel to deliver financial management services.71 Electronic 
finance is the use of digital communication and computation to provide financial 
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services.72 These services include online banking, electronic fund transfers, and 
investments.  
Given the growth of internet-based services, financial account aggregators 
are developed to fill the gap of convenience and efficiency. Typically, an 
individual have accounts with several organizations. In order to obtain an 
overview of his or her financial standing, the individual needs to log into each 
account separately and manually assemble each piece of their financial puzzle. 
This tedious process can be replaced by adopting an account aggregator. An 
account aggregator is an entity that collects “financial information transparently 
from multiple sources and analyzes it.”73 Account aggregation allows for the 
convergence of personal financial data. This automated service eliminates the 
need for consumers to manually gather their financial information from multiple 
accounts.  
Another added benefit, account aggregators empower individuals by 
providing insights into their financial data. The shift towards electronic finance 
forces institutions to focus on providing exceptional customer services tailored to 
the diverse needs of multiple customer segments.74 To meet these needs, 
account aggregators deliver personalized financial planning advices with respect 
to saving, spending, and investing wealth.75 Aggregators do not simply combine 
data from various financial accounts. These services recommend behavioral 
changes to support users in reaching their financial goals.76  
Aside from benefiting the consumers, transactional data helps lending 
institutions with managing credit risks. Typical risk estimates are based on limited 
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information from the credit bureaus. The use of transactional data projects a 
much more comprehensive overview of a person or a company’s financial 
health.77  For instance, the amount of taxes a business pays can indicate its 
profitability.78 Furthermore, transactional data could help peer-to-peer lenders to 
more accurately differentiate between high and low credit-risk investments and 
appropriately balance risks across their portfolio.79  
Finally, everyone benefits from the sharing of aggregated data. In 2010, 
Mint had delivered a public real-time economic index that drilled down to the city 
level (Figure 1).80 This index was calculated based on aggregated transactional 
data from the anonymous two million of Mint’s thirteen million users, who opted 
to participate in this program.81 Participants could compare their spending habits 
to others in the vicinity, or even nationally, to gain insights into how their peers 
are budgeting.82 In turn, this targeted information help consumers to adjust their 
spending decisions accordingly. Additionally, researchers and policymakers 
could use this index to evaluate real-time economic impacts of policies, global 
events, and natural disasters. 
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Figure 1.  Consumer Spending Index from Mint.83 
In order to reap the aforementioned benefits, the following sections 
examine three key factors that greatly contributed to the flourishing industry. 
These key elements are legislation, technology, and security. Legislations and 
regulations protect consumer benefits. On the other hand, the accompanying 
technology defines purpose and encourages consumer adoption. Lastly, 
information security and privacy are imperative to ensure growing participation.  
A. LEGISLATIONS AND REGULATIONS 
The rise of electronic finance’s popularity urges scrutiny of applicable 
legislations and regulations. Online financing did not exist prior to the enactment 
of some of the laws regulating financial services. Therefore, understanding how 
                                            
83 Source: Ibid. 
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policymakers applied existing legislations to new services will be insightful, since 
their decisions directly impact the growth of an industry.  
In regards to security and customer liability, the Federal Reserve Board 
still has yet to issue clear guidance on the applicability of Regulation E. Enacted 
in 1978, Regulation E defines a financial institution as one which issues its 
customers “an ‘access device’ (such as an ATM and PIN)” and allows electronic 
funds transfer.84 This regulation limits customer liability and holds institutions 
responsible for customers’ losses due to security breaches.85 Federal Reserve 
Board has sought comments from the public regarding the applicability of 
Regulation E to account aggregators, but it has yet to issue formal clarifications 
after the comment period had ended on August 31, 2000.86 However, the 
regulation does include language indicating that those services not explicitly 
stated in the regulation would fall under Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC) 
jurisdiction.87 Additionally, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency of the 
U.S. Department of the Treasury issued guidance in February 2001 to encourage 
banking institutions to take on a more conservative interpretation if they choose 
to provide account aggregation services.88 However, the guidance referred 
strictly to banks interested in providing aggregation services. Independent or 
external aggregators were not explicitly mentioned.  
Conversely, the Gramm-Leach-Bailey Act (GLBA) clearly describes 
confidentiality safeguards for consumers using account aggregation services. 
The GLBA defined financial institutions as any organization that engages in 
financial activities, such as data processing, transmission, hardware, and 
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 22
software.89 Thus, the FTC and Federal Reserve Board interpreted GLBA privacy 
provisions to include account aggregators.90 The privacy requirements, Title V of 
the GLBA, require written policies and disclosures to customers.91 Also, account 
aggregators need to allow customers to opt out of sharing information with non-
affiliates, and they could only share aggregated information with third parties to 
support their services.92 These requirements protect information confidentiality 
and empower consumers with control over their shared data. 
Another possible privacy trigger is the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA). 
The FCRA regulates consumer reporting agencies, which are institutions that 
share customers’ information gathered outside of their businesses or services.93 
FCRA considers the disclosing organization a consumer reporting agency, 
unless the receiving party is an affiliate and complies with providing FCRA 
notification and opt-out provisions.94 If dictated as a consumer reporting agency, 
the institution must “ensure that the information it provides will be used for 
legitimate business purposes, to maintain the integrity of the data, and to provide 
notice to consumers of their ability to review and correct inaccurate 
information.”95 These mandates warrant the accuracy and quality of data being 
disseminated about the consumers. Applicability of FCRA to account aggregators 
will depend on organizations’ data gathering and sharing practices.  
Despite having the necessary legislations and regulations in place, none 
overtly refers to account aggregators. While GLBA is the most clearly interpreted, 
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Regulation E and FCRA are still left open for interpretation. This level of flexibility 
seems to display an encouraging attitude towards the advancement of account 
aggregators.  
B. TECHNOLOGY 
Account aggregators typically use the screen scraping method to gather 
users’ information. Screen scraping “involves the simulation of users’ behaviors 
to access the financial account website and scrape account summary information 
from the site.”96 Essentially, an aggregator logs into users’ accounts with their 
logon information. Then, the aggregator extracts data from accounts’ webpages 
and consolidates them in one central location. Financial aggregators automate 
this process as well as summarize and analyze users’ account information. The 
following two sections examine the most notable aggregation and sharing 
features of personal financial aggregators. 
1. Data Aggregation 
Account aggregators motivate individuals to become their own financial 
managers with real-time, simple, and insightful dashboards. Delivering a 
centralized hub, Mint automatically gathers real-time information from users’ 
bank accounts, credit bureaus, and investment companies.97 The Intuit 
supported software saves users the time and effort involved in logging onto 
various financial accounts to collect up-to-date budget information. Its interface 
provides an overview of users’ financial health at a glance. In one screen, Mint 
displays wealth allocation across various accounts as well as trends, alerts, 
credit score, and personalized advices (Figure 2).98 Along with the overview, Mint 
provides additional tabs showing users’ transactions, goals, trends, investments 
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and ways to save. Users can get a current and complete picture of their net worth 
at any time and on any device.  
 
Figure 2.  Dashboard of Mint.99 
Proactive monitoring is another key feature of account aggregators. Mint is 
capable of providing up to twenty types of alerts for its users.100 These warnings 
include notifications of over budget, hidden fees, suspicious account activities, 
and bill reminders.101 Mint signals areas requiring additional attention and 
alleviate hidden financial burdens from unsuspecting customers. With financial 
aggregators, users can now be alerted of any issue regarding their accounts, 
whereas these anomalies might have gone undetected otherwise.  
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Furthermore, automated adjustments reduce the need for users to make 
changes manually. Betterment manages users’ investments based on their 
financial goals. As a robo-advisor, it uses digital algorithms to optimize its 
portfolio analysis and investment strategies.102 Focused on investing for 
retirement funds, Betterment tends to maximize return with minimal risks.103 It 
automates users’ retirement planning with its proprietary tools, such as auto-
deposits, SmartDeposit, and intelligent account rebalancing.104  
Aside from managing current expenditures and investments, financial 
aggregators allow users to anticipate and adapt to life-changing events. Personal 
Capital provides tailored portfolio management with a synopsis of personal net 
worth, portfolio analysis, and retirement planner (Figure 3).105  Via analytics, 
Personal Capital let users see how planned or unplanned events impact their 
financial health. Specifically, users could experiment and evaluate how certain 
events affect their retirement goals.106 These events include college tuitions, 
purchase of a new home, marriage, and adoption.107 This feature prepares users 
for possible adjustments they might need to make in order to accommodate 
these life events without diverting from their financial goals. 
                                            










Figure 3.  Retirement Planner from Personal Capital.108 
Lastly, users can compare their overall financial standing to the market. 
Personal Capital allows users to compare their indexed rate of return to that of 
the stock market (Figure 4).109 Market trends available for comparison include 
the Standard and Poors (S&P) 500, Dow Jones Industrial Average (DOW), 
Foreign Index, and U.S. Bond Index.110 The graph visualizes users’ portfolio 
performances against that of the market. Users could use this function as an 
additional tool to evaluate the growth of their investments with considerations for 
market conditions. 
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Figure 4.  Graph of Market Trend Comparison from Personal Capital.111 
2. Data Sharing  
Users can obtain their financial data from account aggregators. 
Transactional data from Mint can be exported as a common separated value 
(CSV) file (Figure 5).112 Users are then able to share this raw data or perform 
any additional analysis to their liking. Mint empowers users by providing them the 
option to access, share, and own their aggregated financial data. 
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Figure 5.  Exportable CSV File from Mint.113 
Moreover, account aggregators allow users to designate an additional 
party to be informed. Mint’s weekly summaries are “built for two.”114 Users can 
elect to have a partner to also receive account updates. Correspondingly, 
Betterment provides the option for joint accounts.115 This option allows both 
account holders to create common goals, transfer funds, change allocations, and 
monitor the account. 
Aside from sharing information with friends and family, personal financial 
aggregators connect users to professional advisors as well. Users of Personal 
Capital have access to dedicated advisors to help them create a “globally 
diversified investment portfolio tailored around…[their] unique financial goals.”116 
These advisors are Registered Investment Advisors (RIA), legally bound act in 
the clients’ best interests.117 Access to financial expertise can be done remotely 
or in-person.118 Personal Capital provides a hybrid model of technologically 
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enhanced advising, combining both robo-advising and dedicated financial 
advisors.  
C. SECURITY 
Despite the technological benefits of screen scraping, its associated risks 
need to be examined as well. As the most convenient method of account 
aggregation, screen scraping is also the most vulnerable. Therefore, it would be 
invaluable to review some of the personal financial industry’s countermeasures. 
The following sections explore security practices implemented by developers of 
financial aggregators.  
1. Data Aggregation 
Developers of financial account aggregators model their security level to 
that of the brick-and-mortar institutions. With respect to security, financial 
institutions have earned their position as the standards of excellence with their 
vast experiences and positive reputations. To model after these institutions, Mint 
implemented triple-layered bank-level security features, including “128-bit SSL 
encryption and physical security standards.”119 By mimicking banks’ security 
measures, account aggregators could more easily gain consumers’ confidence.  
Coupled with bank-level security, account aggregators store customers’ 
credentials separately to protect users’ identities. For both Personal Capital and 
Mint, users’ bank account credentials are stored separately from their financial 
data. Personal Capital stores users’ credentials on Yodlee’s database and never 
sends credentials to users’ web browsers.120 On the other hand, Mint stores 
users’ credentials on its own server, which is locked in the cage of an unmarked 
building.121  This segregation of data storage minimizes risks in the event of a 
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security breach. It prevents hackers from obtaining users’ bank account logons 
even if they broke into users’ aggregator accounts. 
Furthermore, financial account aggregators protect consumers against the 
predominant vulnerability of screen scraping with innovative security process. 
The primary concern for screen scraping is its requirement for users to surrender 
their bank account credentials. However, a developer of Mint addressed this 
concern by inventing and patenting a system that allows for it to securely access 
consumers’ bank accounts.122 By targeting this vulnerability, Mint is able to 
gather and analyze users’ bank account information without the risk of 
compromising users’ credentials in the process.   
Equally important is the establishment of strict control over internal 
accesses. Personal Capital maintains that no one can access customers’ 
credentials.123 On the other hand, Mint’s encrypted credentials are only 
accessible via a key that is split into five pieces, each held by a senior 
manager.124 As a result, account aggregators diminish the risk of breaches due 
to employees’ insecure practices. These unique safeguards reduce human errors 
in causing information security incidents.  
In addition to internal security measures, independent third-party reviews 
bolster account aggregators’ system security. Personal Capital operates under 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) guidelines, which require regular 
audits by independent auditors.125 The auditors are to be completely 
independent for the duration of the audit and any association or relationship with 
                                            
122 David Michaels, United States Patent: 8566952 - System and method for encrypting data 
and providing controlled access to encrypted data with limited additional access, 8566952, issued 
October 22, 2013, http://patft.uspto.gov/netacgi/nph-Parser?Sect1=PTO1&Sect2= 
HITOFF&d=PALL&p=1&u=%2Fnetahtml%2FPTO%2Fsrchnum.htm&r=1&f=G&l=50&s1=8,566,95
2.PN.&OS=PN/8,566,952&RS=PN/8,566,952. 
123 Personal Capital, “Financial Planning Software & Finance Apps.” 
124 Jennifer Saranow Schultz, “Should You Trust Mint.com?,” New York Times. 
125 Personal Capital, “Financial Planning Software & Finance Apps.” 
 31
the client companies must be disclosed.126 This condition ensures the reliability 
and trustworthiness of their evaluations. Lastly, even though Mint does not 
require audits by securities regulators, it still obtains verification by third parties, 
TRUSTe and VeriSign.127 TRUSTe ensures data privacy128 while VeriSign 
secures domain infrastructure.129   
Ultimately, the best safeguard is that most personal account aggregators 
are not capable of transferring money. Both Mint130 and Personal Capital131 are 
granted read-only access to users’ account information. Therefore, there is no 
risk of money being transferred in and out of users’ accounts by malicious actors. 
This safety net allows users to provide their logon information with less 
hesitation.  
2. Data Sharing  
In terms of data sharing, Mint ensures the de-identification of users’ 
personal financial data. To start, Mint collects very minimal PII.132  The less PII 
collected, the lower the risk of users’ identities being compromised. Furthermore, 
only users’ emails are linked to their accounts.133 Users’ logon information and 
credentials are never linked to their financial data.134 Therefore, hackers would 
not be able to use the financial data from account aggregation services to identify 
users. 
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Correspondingly, aggregation also helps to protect individuals’ identities. 
Even though Mint could share users’ data with third parties, it ensures that this 
data is aggregated or anonymized.135 Aggregation removes the information 
necessary for malicious actors to identify individuals. The appropriate level of 
aggregation safeguards individuals’ privacies without compromising quality 
insights. 
                                            




Conventionally, healthcare data was restricted to those generated 
sporadically by doctors during office visits. According to the Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), protected health information (PHI) 
includes “individually identifiable health information” from covered entities.136 PHI 
comprises of patients’ health conditions, prescribed healthcare provisions, and 
payments for services.137 In other words, conventional healthcare data refers to 
patients’ records created during doctor’s appointments. However, doctor’s visits 
for Americans have dropped to about four times a year on average in 2010138 
with median visit lengths of about 15.7 minutes for primary care.139 The 
infrequent and brief visits lead to sparsely documented patient records. These 
challenges negatively impact the quality of physician care. Therefore, it has 
become even more difficult for physicians to obtain a holistic view of their 
patients’ health. 
In addition, patients do not have ownership to all of their healthcare 
information. While individuals have the rights to access, amend, or obtain a copy 
of their medical records under the HIPAA’s rules, healthcare providers are still 
the owners of such data since it is part of their business records.140  
Furthermore, originators that create anonymized or aggregated healthcare data 
also own them, and these data are not subjected to HIPAA’s privacy 
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provisions.141 In other words, if a person or an organization aggregated a subset 
of patients’ records, this person or organization becomes the owner of such data 
rather than the patients. Aside from medical records, other types of healthcare 
information also typically belong to the individual or organization that created 
it.142 Thus, patients have very limited ownership and control over their health 
data. 
Despite conventional definitions of data and ownership, the availability of 
wearable technologies challenges these established traditions. By 2017, eighty 
million wearable sensors are estimated to be available for health-related 
usages.143 The pervasiveness and affordability of low-cost wearable sensors 
encourage individuals to self-monitor. Additionally, these sensors equip anyone 
with the capability to continuously track personal biometrics. Wearable 
technologies allow any individual to generate what traditionally would be 
considered PHI. 
As wearables become omnipresent, individuals will be the biggest and 
most valuable producers of healthcare data. As of 2012, consumers had 
generated 68% of the world’s 2.8 zettabytes data, which is expected to reach 40 
zettabytes by 2020.144 This is equivalent to about 5,200 gigabyte of data per 
person, with most of these data captured passively.145 The volume of consumer-
generated data greatly surpasses those from sporadic doctor’s visits. Also, this 
data is much more consistent and comprehensive. With wearable devices, 
consumers can capture detailed health information at a much higher frequency, 
without having to make appointments and trips to doctor’s offices. 
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Aside from being the biggest producers, consumers also become the main 
benefactors of self-tracked data. Individuals can receive personalized feedbacks 
by quantifying their daily experiences. A Bloomberg article documented 
individuals that are able to transform their lives with self-experiments, from 
tracking mood swings to physical changes in the body.146 For example, an app 
called Happiness was designed to become a substitute for chemical anti-
depressants.147 By tracking mood changes throughout their day via this app, 
users are made aware of events that negatively impact their happiness, and they 
can subsequently make any changes as deemed necessary.148 Ultimately, 
consumers are empowered to take on a more active role in managing their 
health.  
In addition to informal uses, the quantified-self data could objectively serve 
as a second medical opinion. Based on data from the Center for Disease Control 
and Prevention in 2013, British Medical Journal (BMJ) reported medical error as 
the third most common cause of death.149 Though some level of human errors 
might be inevitable, the medical community could drastically lower the probability 
by supplementing doctors’ subjective medical diagnoses with impartial data. The 
XPrize’s Qualcomm Tricorder competition could achieve this goal in the near 
future. The competition aims to “stimulate innovation and integration of precision 
diagnostic technologies, helping consumers make their own reliable health 
diagnoses anywhere, anytime.”150 Its contestants are to develop a device that 
could accurately diagnose thirteen health conditions and measure five vital 
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signs.151 The healthcare community could greatly diminish risks for misdiagnosis 
or mistreatment by using the quantified-self data to either pre-diagnose or verify 
physicians’ evaluations.  
Apart from encouraging self-tracking and objective diagnoses, the 
quantified-self movement delivers a new way for consumers to connect with key 
stakeholders pertinent to their health. Apple has expanded its role in revamping 
mobile health by connecting consumers to researchers and healthcare providers. 
According to Apple, ResearchKit152 and CareKit153 can help to advance different 
dimensions of mobile health with existing technologies embedded in its mobile 
devices. Apple promotes ResearchKit as a way for researchers to conduct 
inexpensive and high quality clinical studies without geographical restrictions.154 
Equally important, CareKit allows users to track their recovery and share updates 
with their healthcare providers.155  
Correspondingly, Google had unveiled the Baseline Study that parallels in 
ambition to Apple. According to Wall Street Journal Europe, leaders of the 
Baseline Study intend to find biomarkers for early disease detection to shift 
medicine towards preventative care.156 With participants’ data, researchers will 
use Google’s immense computing power to search for patterns that constitute a 
healthy human.157 After defining patterns of a healthy human, they could detect 
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deviations that might indicate onsets of diseases. Hence, this project further 
signifies the immense potential of aggregating and sharing of health data.  
Given its overwhelming benefits, the quantified-self movement should 
continue to expand successfully. To understand its consumer impacts, the 
following sections examine how the same three factors are operating in the 
healthcare industry. Current healthcare sector’s practices with respect to 
legislation, technology, and security are discussed in order to understand its 
implications. 
A. LEGISLATIONS AND REGULATIONS 
New digital data has led to unexpected sources and uses that might not 
fall under existing laws. Current legislations and regulations were drafted prior to 
the availability of digital healthcare data. Therefore, the quantified-self data might 
not be protected under existing laws. However, to ensure the security and 
privacy of consumer-generated data, it will be necessary for legislations and 
regulations to keep pace. 
A legislative gap exists in the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPAA) for self-generated data. In 1996, HIPAA established 
requirements to safeguard data privacy and security for the healthcare 
industry.158 Specifically, HIPAA requires covered entities to “implement data 
protection policies and reasonable security procedures.”159 Covered entities 
include healthcare providers, insurers, select intermediaries, and business 
associates that manage PHI for these entities.160 In this sense, apps or data 
used within those settings would fall under HIPAA’s provisions.161 When the law 
was drafted, HIPAA had included all foreseeable entities that could produce and 
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use PHI. Yet, with the quantified-self movement, consumers are rapidly taking on 
roles similar to that of covered entities, since they not only generate but also use 
health-related data. However, HIPAA does not apply to data or apps produced 
solely for personal use. Self-generated data only become PHI once it is shared 
with covered entities that are designated by HIPAA. 
Despite the legislative gap, Federal Trade Commission (FTC) issued 
guidance to hold developers responsible for being transparent with their intended 
use of consumers’ data. Section Five of the Federal Trade Commission Act 
prohibits deceptive acts or practices.162 Under the act, FTC has the authority to 
prevent app developers from misrepresenting their intended use of consumers’ 
information.163 With the growth of mobile health apps, FTC took the initiative to 
help developers with navigating the regulatory requirements by releasing an 
interactive tool164 and best practices165 in April 2016. The web-based tool 
engages developers by noting relevant laws or regulations, even those beyond 
FTC’s oversight, that need to be considered for their products.166 Accompanying 
the tool, FTC also published best security and privacy practices that developers 
are encouraged to implement.167  
Aside from the HIPAA and FTC’s guidance, developers are also held 
responsible for the security of medical apps per Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) regulations. As a proponent of mobile app development, FDA does not 
want to restrict the advancement of health applications. Therefore, according to 
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the guidance released in 2015, FDA chose to only regulate a subcategory of 
healthcare apps that it classifies as mobile medical apps.168 Mobile medical apps 
are defined as those that are intended “to be used as an accessory to a 
regulated medical device” or “to transform a mobile platform into a regulated 
medical device.”169 FDA believes these devices to be the most risky if they were 
to fail or not perform as intended.170 Thus, FDA’s efforts are focused mainly on 
this subset of mobile apps. 
Overall, even though HIPAA’s coverage is insufficient, FTC and FDA are 
attempting to keep pace as digital healthcare data becomes more widely 
available. FTC protects consumer-generated data from deceptive uses by 
developers, while FDA issued guidance to reduce risks for qualified medical 
applications. However, HIPAA’s provisions are not extended to self-generated 
information unless it is shared with the designated covered entities. As more 
digital data are generated, policymakers need to be aware of new sources and 
uses of PHI that might require additional consideration to ensure the safety and 
privacy consumers’ information. 
B. TECHNOLOGY 
Most quantified-self applications are integrated via the application program 
interface (API). APIs govern how one application interacts with another.171 It 
exposes a portion of the codes to allow apps to communicate without needing to 
reveal all of its proprietary programs. With APIs, applications can transmit 
information to one another. For instance, APIs could share users’ credentials 
between different apps, so users can conveniently sign into multiple applications 
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with a single authentication. The following sections examine current best 
practices of healthcare aggregators. 
1. Data Aggregation 
Users obtain a holistic and customizable view of their health and fitness 
statuses with real-time dashboards. Apple’s Health application and HealthKit, 
open API framework, consolidate multiple data sources to generate a simple 
summary dashboard.172 The different data sources include information collected 
via device sensors, third-party apps, and users’ manual inputs.173 Users have the 
option to select the activities they want to be displayed. Each activity is graphed 
separately as a bar chart (Figure 6). By scrolling through, users can see their 
activity levels for different time intervals: day, week, month, or year.  
 
Figure 6.  Dashboard of Apple’s Health.174 
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Released by Harvard Medical students, Sherbit is another app that allows 
users to merge an even greater variety of data sources. Sherbit aims to provide 
context to users’ online information by helping consumers access data from 
social media apps, even if those apps are not directly related to health and 
fitness.175 For example, if an individual were interested in how “likes” on their 
tweets impacts their activity level, the user would grant Sherbit permission to 
retrieve data from Twitter and Fitbit.176 Then, the app would display a graph of 
the number of likes over time (Figure 7). Another graph for the number of steps 
recoded by Fitbit would be displayed in a similar manner. Even though data from 
each source is graphed separately, these two charts are stacked to provide a 
visual comparison. 
 
Figure 7.  Dashboard of Sherbit.177 
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Aside from displaying summarized information, health apps attempt to 
proactively monitor users’ health via reminders and alerts. Google Fit, an android 
application, allows users to set personal fitness goals.178 Its daily activity and 
step goals can be modified based on personal preferences.179 Furthermore, 
Google Fit also sends periodic notifications of goal updates and reminders to 
encourage users to continue towards their fitness goals.180 Apart from fitness, 
Apple’s CareKit tracks recovery plans after surgeries or treatment plans based 
on medical diagnoses.181 It provides insights by comparing designated treatment 
plans to patients’ recovery progresses.182 The Insight module from CareKit 
displays tips and alerts to ensure that users stay on track through recovery 
(Figure 8).  
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Figure 8.  Dashboard of CareKit’s Insight Module.183 
2. Data Sharing 
Though not explicitly useful, consumers do have the option to export their 
data from Apple’s Health app. The Health app allows users to export their data in 
an Extensible Markup Language (XML) format.184 The export option 
automatically creates a zip file for users to email it to themselves or others.185 
The file contains all of an individual’s health data that has been captured via the 
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app. Yet, the XML file consists of codes that seem incomprehensible to the 
average consumer (Figure 9).  
 
Figure 9.  XML Data Export File from Apple’s Health.186 
Aside from accessing raw data, users have the option to share their 
recovery progresses. Consumers can keep their family, friends, and health 
professionals updated on changes in their heath statuses with the Connect 
module from Apple’s CareKit.187  Sharable information includes treatment plans 
from the Care Card, improvements tracked via the Symptom and Treatment 
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Tracker, and effectiveness of the treatment plan via the Insight Dashboard.188 
The Connect module facilitates two-way communications necessary to ensure 
efficient and effective care. 
Finally, healthcare apps can also connect users to medical researchers. 
Researchers can use the ResearchKit to design experiments with participants’ 
mobile health data.189 A news review of ResearchKit states that it “accesses 
sensors in the iPhone, including the accelerometer, microphone, gyroscope, and 
GPS sensors, in order to gain insight into [users’] gait, motor impairment, fitness, 
speech, memory, and more.”190 Once participants agree to share their health 
data via the app, researchers use the credentials they receive to retrieve 
information from participants’ phone.191  The open-source software kit empowers 
universities and research teams to reach participants for medical trials and 
studies without geographical restrictions.  
C. SECURITY 
While APIs provide the necessary data interoperability for healthcare 
applications, they also carry associated vulnerabilities. A leading technology 
research and advisory firm, Ovum Consulting, recently published survey results 
indicating a lack of clarity on APIs’ security responsibilities.192 These 
responsibilities seem to be almost evenly split between the security and 
developer teams.193 Due to vague accountability, it is imperative to prioritize 
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security with the growth of health applications and APIs. The next sections 
discuss best security practices in data aggregation and sharing.  
1. Data Aggregation 
Quantified-self aggregators secure users’ data by storing it locally. Sherbit 
stores all users’ information locally.194 By confining users’ data to their devices, 
Sherbit limit the potential impact of a breach. However, Sherbit is planning on 
giving users the option to store and sync their health data to a central server in 
the future.195 Still, users could opt-out if they prefer to keep their data locally.196  
Another component to information security is data transmission. Google 
Fit ensures security in its data collection with authenticated and encrypted 
connections.197 Unless both of these requirements are met, it is impossible for 
users’ devices to communicate with Google’s server.198 This security measure 
prevents information from being intercepted without users’ consent or 
awareness.  
Aside from data security, healthcare companies focus on preventing 
security incidents due to employees’ oversight. Sherbit promises necessary 
trainings and security procedures to ensure the safety of users’ information.199 
Even though its employees can access users’ information, Sherbit is confident in 
its trainings for employees to appropriately handle sensitive healthcare 
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information.200 Promoting security awareness, Sherbit’s targeted trainings aim to 
lower the risk of data breaches due to employees’ mishaps. 
Lastly, health data aggregators are mixed in their approaches to ensure 
HIPAA compliance. Developers wanting to connect to Apple’s HealthKit need to 
make sure that their apps comply with the HIPAA or other regulations as 
applicable.201  Apple let external developers take on responsibilities to ensure 
regulatory compliance, specifically in regards to HIPAA’s privacy provisions. On 
the other hand, Google bluntly states that Google Fit is non-compliant with 
HIPAA and discourages users from subjecting its application to any HIPAA-
related usage.202 Google warns against uses of Google Fit that might fall under 
the purview of HIPAA or FDA.203 This declaration relieves Google of any 
legislative or regulatory liabilities and places these burdens on its users instead. 
2. Data Sharing 
Developers of healthcare apps prevent misuses of users’ information by 
setting stringent guidelines. Both Apple’s HealthKit204 and Google Fit205 prevent 
sensitive data from being used for advertising or purposes other than intended. 
Likewise, Sherbit promises not to share any information with third parties without 
users’ consent, except under extreme circumstances. These strict policies are 
designed to ensure consumer privacy.  
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Moreover, consumers are granted control over third-party accesses to 
further restrict unwanted use of their data. They can set different permission 
levels for third parties for both Apple’s HealthKit and Google Fit.206 Since both 
apps are open to developers, users’ control over third-party accesses is a 
necessity.207 Furthermore, based on developers’ best practices for ResearchKit, 
users should have control over data shared with researchers and data shared by 
researchers with others.208 Participants should also be given the option to leave 
the research at any point.209 These emphases on users’ control over third-party 
accesses further reinforce users’ ownership and prevent deceptive misuses. 
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IV. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS VIA PORTER’S 
FIVE FORCES FRAMEWORK 
Overviews of financial services and healthcare reveal that each industry 
has its own legislations, technological developments, and security processes. 
These characteristics impact the quality and security of services that consumers 
receive. Since consumers are policymakers’ main concern, it is imperative to 
understand how financial services industry’s practices benefit its consumers. The 
comparison would also reveal healthcare industry’s areas needing improvement.  
For the comparative analysis, Porter’s Five Forces Framework is applied 
to explore how the two industries’ relate to their respective consumers. 
Traditionally, prospective firms use Porter’s Five Forces Framework to assess 
competitive forces in developing strategies for entering an industry.210 However, 
this thesis is using the framework to demonstrate how the competitive dynamics 
of each industry benefits its respective users. The comparison is organized 
based on the five forces, which include competitive rivalry, threat of new entrant, 
threat of substitute products or services, bargaining power of suppliers, and 
bargaining power of buyers (Figure 10).211  
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Figure 10.  Diagram of Porter’s Five Forces Framework.212 
The five forces can be categorized into two types of competition, vertical 
and horizontal.213 Vertical competition describes interactions between firms at 
successive stages of a supply chain, such that manufactures take on a more 
important role.214 Of the five forces, bargaining power of suppliers and buyers 
are considered to be part of the vertical competition. In contrast, horizontal 
competition refers to interactions between firms at the same stage of a supply 
chain.215 In this case, firms’ decisions on pricing, investment, or research would 
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have more of an impact on an industry’s competitive dynamics.216 The remaining 
three forces are considered to be part of horizontal competition: competitive 
rivalry, threat of new entrants, and threat of substitute products or services. 
One of the key horizontal forces is competitive rivalry. Competitive rivalry 
describes the “intensity of rivalry among firms.”217 Rivalry exists because firms 
are mutually dependent and incumbent firms seek opportunities to gain profit.218 
There are a number of factors impacting the intensity of rivalry, including number 
of firms, market growth, product differentiation, exit barriers, and rival diversity.219 
Another one of the three horizontal forces is threat of new entrants. The 
threat of new entrants describes how potential new competitors threaten existing 
competitors.220  Increasing barriers for firms to enter an industry lowers this 
threat. Factors influencing barriers to entry include government policies, patents 
and proprietary knowledge, and economies of scale.221 
Thirdly, threat of substitutes is the last of the horizontal forces. Substitute 
products or services refer to those from a different industry that can be used in 
place of the product or service of interest. The threat of substitutes refers to the 
potential negative impact of a substitute on the product of interest.222 Typically, 
this effect is derived from the impact of changes in price of a substitute on the 
demand for the product in question.223 However, other factors could also raise 
concerns, such as technology and changing environments.224  
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First of the vertical forces is bargaining power of suppliers. Suppliers are 
those that provide raw materials to the industry of interest.225 Hence, the 
bargaining power of suppliers describes suppliers’ leverage on an industry’s 
competitive dynamics. Key factors impacting bargaining power of suppliers 
include supplier concentration, cost to switch suppliers, and credible threat of 
forward integration.226 
Last of the five forces, bargaining power of buyers is the other vertical 
force. Power of customers describes how much buyers could influence an 
industry’s dynamics.227 For instance, in a market with strong buyer power, 
customers set the price for goods.228 Factors impacting bargaining power of 
buyers are buyer concentration, volume of purchase, and credible backward 
integration threat.229 
A. COMPETITIVE RIVALRY 
Strategic diversity and product differentiation are two indicative factors of 
competitive rivalry. Strategic diversity refers to an industry consisting of 
companies with unique approaches to conduct businesses.230 These companies 
tend to position themselves differently from others. The unpredictability of their 
unique strategies increases rivalry intensity.231 Conversely, product 
differentiation describes the bases for distinguishing a firm’s product versus that 
of its competitors’.232 Higher product differentiation lowers competitive rivalry. 
Based on conventional definitions, these two factors have opposite effects on 
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firms’ rivalry intensity. However, from the policymakers’ perspective, both 
stimulate innovations that benefit consumers in different ways.  
By examining the two industries, it is clear that products from both sectors 
offer basic analogous capabilities. For instance, most services include a 
centralized dashboard for clear and holistic visualization. The dashboards allow 
users to have instant access to multiple sources of data. Moreover, these 
aggregators include rudimentary abilities for proactive goal monitoring, which is 
imperative to promote behavioral changes. Additionally, the alert features guide 
users to progress toward personal goals. 
In contrast to healthcare services, financial account aggregators provide 
more comprehensive feedbacks for their users. Even though both industries 
employ some form of proactive monitoring, the two sectors design this feature to 
serve different purposes. Health apps are focused on informing users of their 
progress and reminding them of their goals. However, financial aggregators do 
not strictly inform and remind users, but instead look to alert unwary users of 
suspicious activities as well as noting personalized advices and 
recommendations. 
Furthermore, personal financial aggregators’ sophisticated algorithms 
enable automation and complex analysis. Focused on reaching users’ financial 
goals, account aggregators are capable of automatically adjusting wealth 
allocations to optimize returns. With such automation, account aggregators could 
instantly adapt to market fluctuations. By the same token, personal financial 
services also provide the capability to perform predictive analysis. For example, 
users could estimate the impact of various life events on their financial goals. 
This feature not only allows users to plan for such milestones, but also prepares 
them financially and mentally.  
Based on these observations, healthcare aggregators are much more 
strategically diverse. The first example of healthcare aggregators’ strategic 
diversity is their attempt to target both segments: users and developers. By 
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launching applications and APIs, healthcare leaders aim to accommodate both 
types of customers. Additionally, healthcare services are designed for a variety of 
purposes. For instance, Google Fit is solely intended for tracking personal fitness 
data, while Apple’s apps and APIs are healthcare-centric. Sherbit offers to serve 
an even broader objective, capable of connecting most of users’ data sources. All 
three healthcare competitors are strategically distinguishing themselves by 
appealing not only to different customer segments but to different consumer 
needs as well.  
On the contrary, financial account aggregators are more strategically 
similar. Most aggregators aim to offer users a one-stop shop for all services. 
Account aggregators tend to serve a single purpose, centered on holistic 
financial management despite some level of specialization. For example, Mint is 
mainly for budget management versus Personal Capital for investments, but 
each still have the capability to manage other financial aspects. Personal 
financial services accommodate a wider range of users with these well-rounded 
tools. Each aggregator, despite their specializations, can meet all of the users’ 
basic financial needs.  
Along with similar strategies, personal financial aggregators have a higher 
level of product differentiation. Account aggregators include unique features to 
increase product distinction. In particular, Mint offers free credit score checks as 
well as noting impacts on users’ credit scores based on their specific financial 
habits. Additional notable elements are Betterment’s automated tools and 
Personal Capital’s life event impact analysis. Firms distinguish their products by 
developing unique features that generate value for the consumers. As a result, 
consumers benefit from these analytical innovations. 
In contrast, healthcare aggregators demonstrate much lower product 
differentiation. Healthcare apps deliver basic aggregation services with simple 
visualizations. Typical user interfaces for healthcare apps generally consist of bar 
charts that indicate individuals’ activity levels. While CareKit attempts to provide 
slightly more analysis with its alerts, most apps fail to go beyond simple analytics. 
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Consumers are benefiting from each industry’s competitive rivalry in 
different ways. From the personal financial industry, consumers receive products 
that offer comprehensive essential services supplemented with novel analyses. 
In contrast, though the healthcare industry delivers products with similar 
functionalities, these products are designed to target diverse customer segments 
and consumer needs. Under both circumstances, consumers are benefiting from 
innovative products, even if the focuses of innovation differ.   
B. THREAT OF NEW ENTRANTS 
The threat of new entrants is inversely dependent on barriers to entry. 
Two key barriers to entry for the healthcare and personal financial sectors are 
government policies and patented information. In the following sections, 
consumer benefits based these two factors are evaluated for each sector.  
1. Comprehensive Legislations as Barriers to Entry 
Laws and regulations represent one form of barrier to entry. These 
standards obligate time, effort, or money to ensure compliance. Consequently, 
stringent legislations are more costly to comply with, resulting in a higher barrier 
to entry. From the consumers’ perspective, some level of barrier in this aspect is 
necessary since adequate legislation ensures the security and privacy of their 
information.  
Both industries have some laws in place to ensure data privacy and 
security. The legislative safeguards protect users who adopt aggregation 
services. These protections aim to hold developers responsible for data security, 
transparent privacy policies, and honest intended use of consumers’ data. 
However, healthcare legislation still lacks comprehensive coverage. 
HIPAA does not cover self-generated healthcare information. While FTC 
supplemented existing regulations with a new tool and best practices for the 
developers, FDA only issued stricter guidance for services that qualify as medical 
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apps. These efforts are healthcare regulatory agencies’ attempts to patch the 
gap in HIPAA’s coverage.  
Furthermore, the lack of accountability allows some healthcare developers 
to circumvent regulatory requirements. Google publically proclaims Google Fit’s 
noncompliance with HIPAA and discourages any usage that might trigger HIPAA 
or FDA guidance. This practice forces the consumers to take on the responsibility 
in differentiating between compliant versus non-compliant usage. Similarly, 
instead of vetting the associated apps, Apple requires external developers 
interested in connecting to HealthKit to obtain the necessary compliance for their 
apps. These companies transfer these liabilities to its users and developers due 
to a lack of legislative accountability. 
In contrast, the personal financial sector adapted existing regulations to 
accommodate technological advancements. The financial services industry did 
not announce new regulations when account aggregators had begun to take hold 
in the market. Even though the Federal Reserve Board has yet to issue 
clarifications regarding the applicability of Regulation E, legislators interpreted 
the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) to include account aggregators. No 
regulations were added because current ones are sufficient in guiding account 
aggregator developments and protecting the consumers. 
Based on the comparison, the personal financial industry would have a 
higher barrier to entry. With comprehensive legislative requirements, entrance to 
financial services industry is more costly to prospective developers. The higher 
cost of entry deters low quality firms that are unwilling to invest the necessary 
time and effort. As a result, the personal financial industry would be better 
positioned to continue to deliver secure services to its consumers.    
2. Innovative Security Measures as Barriers to Entry 
Due to data sensitivity, superior security measures become another form 
of barrier to entry. Consumers are more inclined to adopt products with hardened 
security measures. To earn consumers’ confidence, developers must ensure that 
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their security features provide unparalleled protection. By offering the best-in-
class security, developers could more effectively compete with others. Ultimately, 
this drive to outperform their competitors makes security measures a natural 
deterrent for those less qualified. Most importantly, it also motivates firms to 
provide the most secure services for their users.  
The basic security framework for information flow exists in both industries. 
Both sectors take on extra precautions with respect to the security of data 
storage, internal accesses, and sharing of information with third parties. These 
measures are imperative to the establishment of a secure environment for 
consumers to freely share personal data. The minimal requirements for 
information security have been met by both industries.  
Yet, the personal financial industry provides more innovative protection. 
Mint patented a new process for it to securely access consumers’ financial 
information with their bank credentials. Mint’s patent represents proprietary 
knowledge that cannot be replicated. Therefore, the patent owners gain an 
exclusive advantage over their competitors.  
As a barrier to entry, personal financial industry’s pioneering security 
measures result in secure services for its consumers. In essence, patented 
security process raises the barrier to entry. This emphasis on security innovation 
reinforces it as a key deterrent for unqualified competitors and prevents inferior 
products from being released into the market. Accordingly, users of personal 
financial aggregators would continue to benefit from the industry’s higher security 
and legislative barriers. 
C. THREAT OF SUBSTITUTE PRODUCTS OR SERVICES 
Substitutes are products from other industries that perform similarly to the 
ones of interest. Threat from substitutes drives up competitive forces,233 which 
also motivates firms to innovate in order to distance themselves from potential 
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substitutes. Ultimately, consumers are the ones benefiting from these 
technological advancements. The following sections examine a sample of 
potential substitutes: Microsoft Excel, If This Then That (IFTTT), and 
FreshBooks. Microsoft Excel represents the most widely accessible substitute 
product, while IFTTT and FreshBooks are examples of different alternatives.  
1. Microsoft Excel 
Microsoft Excel is one of the most prominent substitutes for data 
aggregators in both sectors. Providing similar services as the aggregators, Excel 
has the necessary functions to enable manual data aggregation and sharing. It 
allows users to create different types of visualizations as well as share raw and 
aggregated data. While it does require a fee to install, most individuals already 
own Microsoft Office Suite for other purposes. Also, since it is a popular tool, 
most should already be familiar with its basic functionalities. These qualities 
render Excel as one of the most viable substitute. 
In terms of security, Excel do not have extensive safeguards built-in, but it 
is also less vulnerable to unwanted accesses. Excel allows users to encrypt and 
password-protect their files. These security features are far inferior in complexity 
and completeness than those available for financial and healthcare aggregators. 
However, Excel data has a lower risk of being hacked or used by third parties 
since it is typically stored locally. The decentralized storage restricts external 
accesses to these data.  
Although locally stored data limits security risks, it also greatly diminishes 
the benefits derived from mass aggregation. Consumers could compare their 
financial or health statuses to that of their peers’ via centralized databases. This 
shared data also helps to advance research by enabling trend investigations and 
population baseline studies. These advantages cannot be realized if all data are 
separately stored on personal laptops.  
Self-recorded data allows for more flexible analysis and visualization 
despite its disadvantages. Users could obtain a holistic view of their financial 
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statuses via account aggregators. On the contrary, using Excel, they would need 
to manually retrieve and record information from each account or activity 
separately. Also, a delay exists for self-recorded data since the information is 
typically captured after the activity took place. Nonetheless, this delay is 
compensated by the flexibility Excel provides. With Excel, users are able to 
create a variety of visualizations and analysis from any portion of recorded data. 
Though healthcare and financial aggregators provide some level of dashboard 
customization, neither is capable of allowing users the freedom to visualize or 
analyze any subset of collected data.  
Similar to Excel, personal financial aggregators allow users to access and 
share usable raw data, whereas the opposite is true for healthcare. Comparable 
to Excel, personal financial aggregators provide users with raw CSV files. These 
files, like Excel files, can also be shared with anyone for customizable analysis 
and visualization. However, users of healthcare aggregators could only export 
their data as an XML file that is not as useful. Although it can also be shared with 
anyone, XML files contain codes that are not readily usable for typical consumers 
wanting to manipulate their raw data.  
Furthermore, financial account aggregators are able to provide more 
sophisticated analyses. These services include automation, predictive analysis, 
and personalized recommendations. More complex analyses and features 
typically require linkages to external programs. Since Excel does not connect 
users’ data to any other programs or services, it is limited in its ability to provide 
more advanced capabilities. 
Based on the assessment, threat of substitution from Excel is valid for 
both industries, but it is lower for personal finance. Excel can meet users’ needs 
for data aggregation and sharing. It also performs comparably. While it makes 
mass aggregation more difficult, Excel has many qualities that render it to be a 
viable substitute.  
 60
Nevertheless, the threat of substitution is lower for the financial services 
industry versus healthcare, because personal financial aggregators offer users 
access to usable raw data similar to that from Excel. Furthermore, it provides 
users with more advanced analytical tools versus both Excel and healthcare 
aggregators. Therefore, Excel is less of a threat to personal financial 
aggregators.  
2. Other Sources of Substitutes: IFTTT and FreshBooks 
Aside from Excel, aggregation services face threats from products that 
enable automation of app data. If This Then That (IFTTT) is a web service that 
automates tasks designated by users with conditional statements.234 Also known 
as “recipes,” these conditional statements take on the form of “if p, then q,” where 
if p is true, then q is also true.235 For example, IFTTT users can track their fitness 
goals by connecting Fitbit to Twitter236 with “if daily Fitbit steps reaches 10,000 
steps, then share this achievement via Twitter.” Analogous to Sherbit, IFTTT’s 
users have greater flexibility in connecting a variety apps data.  
Additionally, as the experienced industry, financial services have more 
prevalent substitutes. Electronic financial account aggregation had appeared 
between 1999 and 2000 in the United States,237 whereas healthcare data 
aggregators have only started to emerge in recent years. Given its success, the 
concept of account aggregation has been reapplied to related industries. In 
particular, FreshBooks is designed for small business owners to track 
expenses.238 Similar to Mint, this service also allows for the automatic import and 
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categorization of account information from banks and credit cards.239  Though 
intended for small businesses, FreshBooks users could easily adopt it for their 
personal expenses as well. 
In conclusion, both financial services and healthcare sectors have 
comparable threats from substitutes. Though Excel is less of a threat to financial 
account aggregators, substitutes are more available given financial account 
aggregation’s maturity. On the other hand, even though they have only been 
developed recently, healthcare aggregators are already facing threats from 
services offering more flexibility in data automation, such as IFTTT. Thus, the two 
industries face equivalent threats from substitutes, resulting in similar influences 
on consumer experiences. 
D. BARGAINING POWER OF SUPPLIERS 
Industry suppliers directly impact aggregation technologies. Since 
personal financial aggregators mostly use the screen scraping method, their key 
supply is banks’ websites. On the other hand, device manufactures are 
healthcare app and API’s key suppliers, because healthcare aggregators gather 
data via devices’ sensors. These suppliers are powerful because their products 
are important inputs to the respective industries and they present credible threats 
of forward integration. 
For financial services, account aggregators based on screen scraping rely 
heavily on the consistency of banks’ website layouts. Screen scraping is one of 
the most popular methods of aggregation. This method logs into users’ accounts 
with their credentials and grabs information from users’ account webpages. 
Perpetual changes to these websites are detrimental to aggregators’ operations, 
because the aggregators would need to be updated continuously to ensure that 
they are capturing accurate bank account information. The mechanics of screen 
scraping makes it highly dependent on banks’ website layouts.  
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On the other hand, healthcare aggregators are highly dependent on 
device manufactures. Healthcare applications and APIs typically gather users’ 
data via phones’ or other devices’ sensors. Information accuracy and security are 
contingent on the availability and reliability of devices’ embedded technologies 
and security measures. In order to track biometric data precisely and securely, 
the technical capabilities and security features of devices’ sensors are of the 
utmost importance. Therefore, device manufactures could shape the 
development of healthcare aggregators.  
Suppliers in both industries produce important inputs that impact its 
buyers’ information gathering process and data quality. Financial account 
aggregators need banks’ website layouts to remain relatively stable in order to 
sustainably generate accurate information. Changes to website layouts not only 
impact their operations but their product quality as well. For healthcare 
aggregators, devices serve as both the information gatherers and delivery 
portals. Therefore, product quality and security is heavily dependent on devices’ 
capability to accurately and securely measure, aggregate, and deliver 
consumers’ data. 
While both industries rely heavily on suppliers’ inputs, healthcare 
aggregation services have a higher credible threat of forward integration. The 
threat of forward integration refers to the possibility of a supplier becoming a 
competitor. In the financial services sector, banks threaten third-party account 
aggregators. Banks are capable and encouraged to provide account aggregation 
services for their customers to prevent them from having to share their account 
logins with third parties. However, this possibility is low because banks do not 
typically have the technical skillset required to develop quality services 
comparable to that from third-party developers. Yet, forward integration is already 
evident in the healthcare sector. For instance, Apple, as a device manufacturer, 
has already released some of the most recognizable health aggregation apps 
and APIs. With successful precedents, this trend is unlikely wean. Thus, 
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healthcare aggregators have a higher credible threat of forward integration and, 
therefore, higher bargaining power of suppliers.  
For this reason, developers’ motivations vary depending on whether they 
take on the additional role as suppliers. The healthcare sector already has a 
strong presence of corporate ownership, resulting in data silos. With healthcare 
suppliers’ greater bargaining power, data interoperability would not be a priority 
for its developers. Since healthcare developers tend to be the same as device 
manufacturers, they are more likely to focus on their apps or APIs’ compatibility 
with their own devices. Thus, integrating data with other devices or apps is 
probably less of a concern. Conversely, personal financial aggregators typically 
originate from third parties. Hence, these third-party developers’ key proposition 
would be to integrate data across various sources, thereby ensuring 
interoperability as their top priority. 
Consequently, users of financial account aggregators receive more 
interoperable products. Data interoperability is essential for users of aggregation 
services. By definition, aggregators should be able to integrate data across a 
variety of sources. As noted previously, personal financial aggregators are better 
positioned to meet this need, because their third-party developers’ have 
motivations that are better aligned with consumer interests. 
E. BARGAINING POWER OF BUYERS 
Bargaining power of buyers is comparable for both industries. Given that 
consumers in the two industries use aggregators in similar manners, buyers are 
likely to exert equivalent influences. In terms of consumer benefits, higher 
bargaining powers indicate that users would have a greater leverage in 
demanding product improvements. Nonetheless, the following analyses reveal 
that buyers of both industries have moderate bargaining power.  
Buyers have low bargaining power because of their large population, need 
for only one aggregator, and low concentration. Buyers’ bargaining powers are 
diluted, because of the large pool of potential users. Aggregators are designed to 
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appeal to the general public; therefore, the number of prospective consumers is 
high. Also, each user typically needs only one data aggregation service, since it 
would defeat the purpose of centralizing information if multiple aggregators are 
adopted. This adoption behavior also contributes to a low concentration of 
buyers, because the ratio of consumer to product is expected to be relatively 
equal. Under those circumstances, all three factors lower the bargaining power of 
buyers.  
However, these three factors are slightly offset by the low switching cost. 
As most aggregators are available for free, the main cost to switch is users’ effort 
spent in adopting a new technology. Since the effort exerted in adopting these 
products cannot be recuperated, it could be viewed as a form of sunk cost, which 
is a type of cost that cannot be recovered once invested.240 This analogy 
indicates that users’ efforts spent in learning one product is essentially wasted 
once they decide to switch to another product. Although, it is important to point 
out that this cost to switch would be insignificant, since aggregators are designed 
to be easy to use. Therefore, the level of effort required to adopt new 
aggregators should be minimal as well. Ultimately, the negligible efforts of 
adoption represent low customer switching cost.  
All of the aforementioned characteristics are equally present in both 
industries, resulting in comparable bargaining power of buyers. Diluted buyers’ 
power results from the large user base, insignificant volume of purchase, and low 
concentration of users. In contrast, the low switching cost increases the 
bargaining power of buyers. Even so, the overall buyer bargaining power is 
moderate for both industries. Hence, consumers have little influence on product 
development.  
                                            




Based on Porter’s Five Forces Framework analysis, leaders of the 
healthcare sector needs to modify its competitive forces to mimic that of financial 
services. The personal financial industry has a lower threat of new entrants and 
bargaining power of suppliers. These weaker forces result in more secure and 
interoperable products for consumers of financial account aggregators. On the 
contrary, the analysis reveals the opposite to be true for healthcare. Hence, 
healthcare industry’s competitive forces need to be reshaped based best 
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V. CONCLUSION 
This thesis concludes with recommendations, implementation strategies, 
limitations, and future research opportunities based on information and analyses 
presented in previous chapters. Recommendations aim to guide healthcare 
leaders to replicate best practices from the financial services industry. 
Implementation strategies include possible approaches to execute the proposed 
recommendations by forming a winning coalition. Finally, this chapter addresses 
study limitations and opportunities for future research. 
A. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The following recommendations focus on reshaping the healthcare 
industry’s competitive forces to increase consumer benefits. These proposed 
changes are mainly derived from Porter’s Five Forces Framework Analysis, 
which highlighted key distinctions between the healthcare and personal financial 
sectors. Three recommendations are suggested as possible ways to stimulate 
healthcare sector’s transformation to more closely mirror that of financial 
services.  
1. Fill the Gap in HIPAA 
Participants of the quantified-self movement need security and privacy 
safeguards to protect their data and identities, respectively. Despite the 
overabundance of benefits associated with self-monitoring, quantified-self 
participants bear considerable risks as well. These risks include profiling by 
insurance companies, location tracking by criminals, extortion of victims, and 
corporate misuse of users’ data.241 Quantified-self participants should not be 
exposed to such vulnerabilities in exchange for their willingness to share 
personal health data for the greater good. 
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More comprehensive data security and privacy provisions are necessary 
to keep users from these potentially damaging impacts. As previously noted, 
legislation in the personal financial industry has no gaps in its security and 
privacy guidelines even with the introduction of account aggregators. This is not 
the case for the healthcare sector. While the FDA published new regulations for 
those designated as medical applications, the majority of quantified-self apps still 
lack basic security guidelines since HIPAA rules do not apply to user-generated 
health data.  
The need to expand healthcare industry’s legislative coverage is further 
supported by the analysis based on Porter’s Five Forces Framework. The 
analysis in this thesis revealed that consumers benefit from personal financial 
sector’s higher security and privacy standards. However, the gap in HIPAA’s 
coverage would negatively impact users of healthcare aggregators. By filling in 
this gap, the healthcare leaders could better ensure the security and privacy of 
their users’ information. 
Yet, legislators should not stifle innovation with the establishment of 
baseline security and privacy requirements for healthcare aggregators. Even 
though the financial services sector has more comprehensive security legislation, 
regulators avoided adding unnecessary hurdles that might compromise 
technological advancement for users’ benefits. These legislators value the 
balance between adequate security measures and industry growth. 
Correspondingly, policymakers could reapply this lesson to the healthcare sector 
by requiring only sufficient security and privacy standards to ensure consumer 
protection. Leaders of healthcare’s emerging quantified-self movement should 
carefully navigate this delicate balance to prevent from unnecessarily 
suppressing innovation.  
2. Encourage Industry Security Innovations 
To advance towards personalized healthcare, developers need to focus 
on providing secure services for their users. The quantified-self movement 
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empowers users to be better informed in understanding and managing their 
health. Even though most quantified-self participants are willing to share their 
data, they also value the privacy of their identities and security of their data. The 
first recommendation serves as the initial attempt to reassure quantified-self 
participants of their information security. In addition, developers of healthcare 
aggregators should be encouraged to focus on innovating security and privacy 
solutions. These innovations could attract even the most wary users to aggregate 
and share their data.  
As seen in the financial services industry, consumers would greatly benefit 
from aggregators’ emphasis on innovative security solutions. Even though screen 
scraping is the most popular yet least secure method of aggregation, financial 
account aggregators have not reported any data breaches. Financial account 
aggregators go beyond the required security provisions, as exemplified by Mint’s 
invitation for non-mandatory third-party audits. Most notably, Mint also invented 
and patented a pioneering security process to counter the main vulnerability of 
screen scraping. With these innovations, users could take advantage of the 
benefits from aggregation without having to be concerned about the security of 
their information. Therefore, leaders of the healthcare industry could adopt 
similar approaches to improve their industry’s consumer benefits as well.  
Furthermore, Porter’s Five Forces Framework validated the consumer 
benefits of security innovations. The personal financial sector has a lower threat 
of new entrants with its inventive and extensive security processes. Development 
of original, or advanced, security measures helps to discourage inferior 
developers from entering the market. Such investments of time and effort 
represent added costs that would deter less qualified entrants. Also, exclusive 
security measures would differentiate financial account aggregators from 
substitutes such as Excel. Therefore, healthcare leaders need to concentrate on 
developing unconventional or cutting-edge security measures to encourage 
consumers to adopt these services. 
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3. Attract Third-Party Developers to Secure Data Interoperability  
To reap the benefits of secure data aggregation and sharing, healthcare 
leaders need to focus on overcoming their industry’s overarching interoperability 
issue. More specifically, device manufacturers and their associated apps often 
segregate users’ data. While APIs enable data convergence, the effectiveness of 
this solution is impeded by the lack of interoperability efforts from corporations. 
Corporations block public access to their protocols and prevent their applications 
from integrating with apps of other firms. Furthermore, the industry’s lack of 
standardization allows some databases to be more susceptible to hacking. These 
databases could become vulnerabilities to other apps or APIs that are connected. 
Therefore, industry leaders should focus on moderating corporate ownership so 
that data could be integrated and shared more securely. 
In order to achieve secure integration, the healthcare industry could attract 
more third-party developers, mimicking the personal financial industry. Third-
party developers, rather than banking institutions, produced most of the financial 
account aggregators. In contrast, healthcare device manufacturers also develop 
most of the leading aggregation apps and APIs. Therefore, these manufactures 
have less motivation and incentive to promote interoperability across devices or 
platforms. In contrast, third-party developers would prioritize the standardization 
of secure integration protocols.  
As evident via the Porter’s Five Forces Framework analysis, third-party 
developers could also increase consumer benefits for the healthcare sector by 
lowering its bargaining power of suppliers. Banks, as suppliers of financial 
account aggregators, have lower bargaining powers, because it is unlikely for 
them to offer aggregation services. However, device manufacturers, as suppliers 
of healthcare aggregators, have already taken on the additional role and 
launched many popular aggregation tools. Healthcare suppliers’ success in 
forward integration could encourage others to follow suit. So, in order to stimulate 
interoperability, third parties should be encouraged to enter the healthcare 
industry. With motivations that align with consumer interests, third-party 
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developers might be more inclined to create standardized protocols for users to 
securely access their data across all barriers: apps, devices, and platforms.  
B. IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGIES – BUILDING A WINNING 
COALITION 
In this section, two possible implementation strategies for the first and 
second recommendations are explored. The first approach would be applicable 
to both recommendations, via the development of industry standards. The 
second approach would be to formalize the first recommendation with legislative 
changes. These two strategies are based on concepts from the Dictator’s 
Handbook. 
Building a winning coalition is the foundation for both implementation 
strategies. According to the Dictator’s Handbook, there are three political groups: 
interchangeables, influentials, and essentials.242 Leaders are encouraged to 
categorize people into these three fundamental groups in order to understand 
their political landscapes. Interchangeables, or nominal selectorates, are the 
largest group of potential supporters. A subset of interchangeables, influentials, 
is the real selectorate that truly drives leadership support. Lastly, essentials are 
the smallest subset of real and nominal supporters, who dictate leadership 
survival. Locating the essentials would be vital to the success of these 
implementation strategies as they are the essence of winning coalitions.  
The third recommendation should transpire with the success of the first 
two. Once both recommendations are implemented, third-party interests should 
grow organically. Based on the conventional application of Porter’s Five Forces 
Framework, the two recommendations should increase healthcare industry’s 
profitability by lowering its threat of new entrants and bargaining power of 
suppliers. Profitable industries tend to attract prospective entrants; specifically, 
entrepreneurial new entrants drive industry growth via innovation. New entrants 
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are more likely to invest in profitable industries, especially since innovation 
creates temporary monopolistic power and profits for the entrepreneurial firm.243  
The potential to become a temporary monopoly greatly incentivizes new firms to 
be creative. Innovation-led developments are crucial to industry growth. Hence, 
healthcare leaders need to ensure the success of the first two recommendations, 
as these changes would be necessary to yield a more favorable industry to 
attract entrepreneurial third parties.   
1. Industry Standards 
To avoid stifling innovation, healthcare industry’s leaders could improve 
consumer benefits via industry standards. Standards Development Organizations 
(SDO) issue industry standards, which reflect industry professionals’ opinion as 
to the “proper way to do or construct or connect a thing.”244 In essence, these 
standards are developed by industry experts as best practices based on their 
consolidated experiences. These published documents “maximize the reliability 
of the materials, products, methods, and/or services people use every day…[and] 
fuel the development and implementation of technologies that influence and 
transform the way we live, work and communicate.”245 Industry standards are 
one of the impactful ways to initiate change in industry practices.  
To facilitate the establishment of industry standards based on 
recommendations from this thesis, industry leaders need to identify the three 
fundamental groups with respect to standards development. Since standards are 
derived from industry professionals, these experts are the interchangeables. 
Next, members of SDOs, as the influential, could contribute to standards 
development depending on SDO rules. Even though these two groups are large 
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and less critical, sufficient efforts should be made to incorporate their opinions. 
Given the open involvement in standards development, support from these two 
groups still holds substantial weight in ensuring successful implementation. 
Within the SDO, dedicated working groups finalize, review, and approve draft 
standards, which are submitted for Sponsor balloting and then to the Review 
Committee and Standards Board. Thus, the winning coalition would require 
substantial representation at each step of the aforementioned process to ensure 
approval.  
In order to form the winning coalition, healthcare leaders should create an 
alliance with technical SDO committee members. Two relevant SDO 
organizations are the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) and 
International Organization for Standardization (ISO). IEEE is the “world’s largest 
technical professional organization dedicated to advancing technology for the 
benefit of humanity.”246 ISO is “an independent, non-governmental international 
organization…[that] brings together experts to share knowledge and develop 
voluntary, consensus-based, market relevant International Standards that 
support innovation and provides solutions to global challenges.” These two 
organizations have formed the ISO/IEEE Partner Standards Development 
Organization (PSDO) Cooperation Agreement to jointly develop international 
standards.247 Both are mission driven to focus on technological advancements. 
These purpose-driven SDOs are less likely to compromise innovation in the 
process of standards development. Furthermore, the agreement includes health 
informatics as a key technical area committee, which looks to improve the 
healthcare system by facilitating exchange and use of health data and 
information.248 Healthcare leaders should include members of this ISO technical 
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committee in their winning coalition in order to implement the first two 
recommendations from this thesis.  
2. Legislative Change  
Alternatively, once industry standards have demonstrated the success of 
these best practices, the first recommendation to fill the gap in HIPAA could be 
formalized via legislative changes. To identify the three political groups within this 
environment, healthcare leaders need to understand the legislative process. The 
following describes the procedure by which laws are processed: 
First, a representative sponsors a bill. The bill is then assigned to a 
committee for study. If released by the committee, the bill is put on 
a calendar to be voted on, debated or amended. If the bill passes 
by simple majority (218 of 435), the bill moves to the Senate. In the 
Senate, the bill is assigned to another committee and, if released, 
debated and voted on. Again, a simple majority (51 of 100) passes 
the bill. Finally, a conference committee made of House and 
Senate members works out any differences between the House 
and Senate versions of the bill. The resulting bill returns to the 
House and Senate for final approval. The Government Printing 
Office prints the revised bill in a process called enrolling. The 
President has 10 days to sign or veto the enrolled bill.249  
Based on the procedure, interchangeables likely include all members of 
Congress. Subsequently, influentials would be the subset of representatives and 
senators necessary to reach a simple majority in both houses, 218 and 51, 
respectively. Finally, as essentials of the winning coalition, committee members 
would be responsible for releasing the bill for voting and lobbying for additional 
support to obtain the simple majority in the House and the Senate. 
In particular, Representative Hank Johnson, a democrat from Georgia, 
would be a valuable member for the winning coalition. Representative Johnson 
introduced the Application Privacy, Protection and Security (APPS) Act in 
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2013.250 The Act seeks to protect users by requiring developers to notify them 
regarding the collection or sharing of users’ information. It also deems 
developers responsible for securing users’ data and identities. This Act seems to 
align closely with the proposed need for baseline security and privacy provisions.  
In this case, growing the winning coalition is imperative. As of May 10, 
2013, the bill has been referred to the House of Representative’s Energy and 
Commerce Committee for their consideration.251  It has gained the support of 
eight cosponsors as of July 31, 2014, including members from both the 
Democratic and Republican parties.252 While the Act has obtained additional 
support since its introduction, it has yet to gain enough momentum to move the 
bill forward either to a subcommittee or a committee hearing. Therefore, 
healthcare leaders should continue to lobby for more substantial support, if they 
decide to pursue legislative changes.  
C. RESEARCH LIMITATIONS 
The research design of this thesis contains certain limitations within which 
the findings should be carefully interpreted. Some limitations to be considered 
include the data availability and lack of generalizability.  
Selection of samples was constrained due to data availability. The case 
studies require detailed documentation on aggregators’ technical capabilities and 
security measures. However, these documents are not always as readily 
available for the less popular aggregators. Therefore, this study mainly included 
well-known aggregators due to the limited availability of documentations. 
Since this comparative study was conducted between specific aggregators 
from the two sectors, it might be difficult to generalize the findings to a broader 
range of products. This thesis simplified the focus aggregation technologies to 
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applications, APIs, and screen scraping. Though these methods of aggregation 
are the widely used and commonly available, there are other methods that were 
not explored in this study. Hence, it might be difficult for policymakers, industry 
leaders, or consumers to extrapolate this thesis’s research findings to other 
technologies.   
D. FUTURE RESEARCH 
Future research directions could focus on overcoming the limitations of 
this study and investigating the applicability of this thesis’s findings to integration 
with EHR systems. With access to better documentations, sample selection 
would not need to be limited to the most popular aggregators. Additionally, more 
representative sampling would improve the generalizability of future research 
findings. To take this even further, researchers could conduct usage tests and 
surveys to determine the ideal technological features and security measures 
necessary to promote consumer participation. Lastly, while this study did not 
consider the interoperability of self-generated data with EHR, this integration 
would be crucial to the advancement towards personalized healthcare. As such, 
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